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Abstract—The current trend in optical networks is to open the 
entire wholesale market to competition. As a result, we will see, 
instead of a single big market player, optical transport networks 
competing with each other to attract customer demand. This 
paper presents a wavelength broker who acts on behalf of 
enterprises, web host companies, financial firm etc. to buy certain 
number of wavelengths from such market. We present the system 
model, the interaction protocol and provide analysis of the 
competition. The simulation results of a business scenario are 
also recorded in the paper.    
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The research on competition between optical transport 
service providers becomes a very important issue especially in 
the light of worldwide globalization of trade and 
telecommunications. Our study aims at integrating business 
models  in the optical networks to increase the optical transport 
service provider’s competitiveness and profitability in the 
telecommunication market. The history of telecommunication 
industry has a distinct pattern of transformation, starting as 
unregulated monopoly, later to a fierce competition, then to 
regulated monopoly, and most recently to (de)regulated 
competition [1]. The current trend in optical networks is to 
open the entire wholesale market to competition [2]. As a 
result, we will see, instead of a single big market player, 
several service providers competing with each other to attract 
customer demand. In this respect, our study provides the 
fundamental microeconomics aspect of the competition and the 
possibilities of business opportunities. Furthermore, it guides 
optical transport service providers through their strategic and 
long term network planning based on profit/loss analysis. The 
scenario of competitive pricing for flow assignment in multi-
wavelength optical networks considers the following:  
(a) Currently, the bandwidth in the optical networks is offered / 
provided in the form of wavelengths wholesale to carriers 
companies, enterprise organizations, web hosting firms,  
governments, etc. [3] [4]. The bandwidth of an optical light-
path in the market over optical fiber is 2.5 Gbps and higher [5].  
(b) Backbone long-haul optical network transport service 
providers (TSPs) are offering their services in terms of 
bandwidth measured in number of wavelengths. 
 (c) Customers such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs), 
enterprise organizations, financial firms, Application Service 
Providers (ASPs), governments, etc.) request an end-to-end 
connectivity (virtual links), which forms a virtual network 
topology. The links of this virtual topology have to be mapped 
on the underlying optical networks.  
     Plenty of research studies were conducted in the past, 
concerning competitive routing in communication networks 
[6], [7], [8] [9] from the microeconomic point of view, where 
users act in a selfish manner and compete for network 
resources until they reach an equilibrium. These studies were 
performed under the assumption that the user competes for 
scarce network resources in one network.  
     The novelty in our approach is the assumption that 
competitors now are the optical networks. They compete to 
allocate customers demand measured in number of 
wavelengths. The competition is assumed to be non-
cooperative, which means, the competitors do not negotiate 
among each other. To the author’s best knowledge, this 
approach has not been considered in the open scientific 
literature by anybody yet.  
     The rest of the paper is organized as follow: In the next 
section we describe the system model. In section 3 we provide 
detail analysis of the non-cooperative game of price 
competition. In section 4, we present routing an wavelength 
allocation followed by the simulation results in section 5. 
Finally, in section 6 we conclude the paper and provide 
directions for future work. 
II. SYSTEM MODEL 
A. Opical wavelengh broker  
On figure 1 we present a typical scenario for network 
competition. We can identify a broker (broker acts on behalf of 
ISPs, web host company, financial firm, etc.) who sends a 
request to the optical transport service providers to buy certain 
number of wavelengths. In this model, the broker, representing 
many customers, decides the number of wavelengths to buy 
based on the cheapest price offer from the suppliers (optical 
network service providers) and the price-demand relationship 
D (p). This price demand relationship is determined by the 
broker based on a pool of individual customers he represents.  
The competition is initiated after the broker sends a request 
for logical link(s) connectivity (understood as virtual topology 
to be mapped on the physical networks) to the service 
providers. The service providers reply with price bids per unit 
wavelength. The broker replies to the service providers asking 
them to lower the bidding below the current minimum price 
without revealing the identity of the service provider who 
offered the minimum price. The interaction and the feedback 
between the broker and the optical transport providers continue 
until the end of the competition, when only one network  can 
offer the lowest price. The broker either accepts the lowest 
price offered, or rejects it, if he cannot afford. 
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Fig. 1. Example of a broker and optical netwokr competition 
B. High-level Communication protocol 
      We develop a high-level communication protocol that 
supports an exchange of messages for competitive price 
setting based on the bids sent by the optical transport service 
providers and received by the broker. Before describing the 
protocol, we wish to point out the assumptions of the non-
cooperative competition among suppliers. 
(a) The broker sends end-to-end connectivity requests to the 
networks asking for a price per unit wavelength. 
(b) Each network first replies with reasonable price based on 
market awareness. Each network is selfish and tries to increase 
its profit regardless of other networks. 
(c) After the initial bidding, the broker submits to the networks 
the minimum price offer without revealing the identity of the 
service provider who offered this price. The broker asks the 
networks to go lower than the current minimum price. If the 
minimum price is the same as the price previously offered, 
then the network does not have to go lower. In this case, the 
service provider can wait for another round.   
(d) If more than one service provider was able to answer with 
a lower price, then step c is repeated. 
(e) The competition ends when only one service provider was 
able to offer a lower price. 
The messages exchange between brokers and service 
providers are shown in table 1. The requested service is the 
virtual connection between nodes X and Y. The networks 
compete by offering price P to win customer demand of 
wavelengths D. In figure 2, without loss of generality and for 
the sake of simplifying the protocol signaling, we will consider 
the case of two competing networks; Network A and Network 
B. It assumed that the duration of the customer connectivity 
request can take hours, days or weeks. The price competition is 
assumed to take milliseconds. Thus, the duration of the price 
competition is instantaneous compared to the duration of the 
request which might be hours, weeks or months. We present 
the sequence diagram of a general case of competition in which 
the broker accepts the final price (the price after finishing the 
competition) and the winner network can accommodate the 
requested number of wavelengths. 
TABLE I.  MESSAGES OF COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL 
Direction Messages Comments 
Customer to 
Supplier 
(Broker to 
Network Service 
provider) 
Reqc (X,Y) Initiate competition for the 
virtual link X-Y  
ocl (X,Y,P)  Offer a lower price than the 
current bid P for the virtual link 
X,Y  
Nack (X,Y) 
 
The link request X-Y not 
granted  
Ack (X,Y,D) The virtual link request X-Y is 
granted with D wavelengths to 
be accommodated 
Supplier to 
Customer 
(Network Service 
Provider to 
Broker) 
offp(P,X,Y) 
 
The wavelength price offered 
for the virtual link X-Y is P 
dollars 
Exceptions  
exc_1(D,P,X,Y) 
(supplier to 
customer) 
 
The requested demand D over 
virtual link X-Y exceeds the 
available network capacity  or 
No capacity to accommodate 
even a single wavelength of the 
link X-Y   
exc_2(X,Y,P) 
(customer to 
supplier) 
The offered price results in 0 
wavelengths demand from the 
customer, the customer can not 
afford 
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Fig. 2. Interaction between the broker and optical transport networks  
    From figure 2, we can identify the following steps: 
Step 1:  The broker initiates the competition by sending his 
connection request to network A and network B. 
Step 2: The suppliers (optical network service providers) 
respond with their price offerings. 
Step 3: The broker responds to the offerings:  
 The broker sends a request to the suppliers (optical 
networks) to undercut the minimum price of the 
offerings P=min (P1, P2,…) without revealing the 
identity of the network that offers the minimum price 
and then the suppliers repeat step 2. 
 If only one competitor was able to lower the price 
while the other competitor cannot, then this 
competitor is a winner and the price is final.  
Step 4:  the broker notifies the winner competitor and sends 
his demand, measured in number of wavelengths. 
 
C. Total and marginal cost in  optical networks  
     In this subsection, we introduce two terms from 
microeconomics, which play a pivotal role in the price 
competition and are necessary for our analysis: the Marginal 
Cost and the Total Cost. Based on these two terms we can 
determine the competitiveness of the optical network.  
 The Total production cost (TC) expresses the total 
expenses required for producing q items of a product and 
it is denoted as TC (q).  
 The Production Marginal Cost (MC) is defined as the 
production cost per unit output. It is defined as the 
change in the total production cost (TC) when producing 
an additional unit, i.e. MC (q) =TC (q+1) -TC (q).  
In the business case of wavelength allocation in optical 
networks the above terms are interpreted as follows: 
 The production units are the wavelengths to be allocated. 
 The unit production cost is the cost for allocating a single 
wavelength on a physical link. The cost per wavelength is 
determined by the need for wavelength regeneration in 
the optical switches and the optical fibers themselves. 
The power necessary for regenerating a wavelength can 
be as high as thousands of Watts [17][18]. This is the 
main reason why the total cost of using a fiber link 
depends on the flow (measured in number of 
wavelengths) over the physical link. 
 The total cost is the sum of all physical link costs along 
the route for accommodating the requested number of 
wavelengths of the virtual link (point-to-point) 
connection. 
 The marginal cost is the allocation cost of a single 
wavelength over a virtual link on the associated physical 
route of the network topology, given that the network has 
already allocated a number of wavelengths in the same 
virtual channel. In other words, it is the cost associated 
with one additional unit of production (known here as 
unit wavelength).  
Example: Consider the network presented in figure 3 with 
the following assumptions:  
1. Customer sends a connection request for a virtual 
channel from Vancouver to Toronto 
2. We consider the following two alternative routes 
from Vancouver to Toronto: 
a. A-B   and   C-D-E-F-G 
3. The capacities and prices of the physical links along 
these routes are given in figure 3. 
     The cheapest route of connection between Vancouver and 
Toronto is A-B. We assume that the allocation cost of an 
additional wavelength on a fiber is constant, as long the 
capacity of the fiber is not exceeded. It can be easily  seen that 
for up to 8 requested wavelengths the whole demand can be 
accommodated on route A-B, because the capacity of the links 
along the route is not exceeded. For requests of 9 wavelengths 
and up, the additional wavelengths have to be allocated on the 
next cheapest route C-D-E-F-G. Requests over 17 
wavelengths and more cannot be accommodated based on the 
fact that the capacity along these two routes is 8 wavelengths. 
From this example we can conclude that:  
 The total cost (TC) is monotonically increasing and piece-
wise linear. 
 The marginal cost (MC) is monotonically increasing and 
piece-wise constant. It is based on the fact that the 
allocation cost of a single wavelength along the route is 
constant, as long the capacity of all links along the same 
route is not exceeded by the current accommodated 
requests. 
Vancouver Toronto
E F
G
Line Capacity= 8 Wavelength
Line Cost = $1
 
Fig.3. Example of an optical network 
III. NON-COOPERATIVE  GAME OF DYNAMIC PRICE 
COMPETITION  
In this section we will consider a dynamic price 
competition game among non-cooperative optical networks. 
Non-cooperative means that the networks do not exchange 
information about their state topology, capacity, etc. In order to 
specify the process of competition we need to define it in terms 
of game theory. The game between the network service 
providers for attracting customer demand can be seen as a Non-
cooperative game. The competition is offering competitive 
prices for allocating the requested wavelength demand. The 
game strategy is undercutting prices. The players are the 
networks. The payoff is the profit from allocating the requested 
demand. Each network is selfish and wants to maximize its 
profit independently and regardless from other networks. Next 
we explain the price undercutting game.  
 
A.  Price undercutting game  
        In price competition, we assume that the networks are 
driven by the awareness of each supplier regarding the 
competition [10]. The price competition is determined by the 
marginal cost (MC) of unit wavelength. The network with 
lower marginal cost (MC) has a competitive advantage to win 
the competition by offering a cheaper price [10]. These results 
are driven entirely by the assumption of homogeneous 
products being offered, which are in our case the wavelengths. 
Let us first present the price competition algorithm: 
 The broker initiates a competition for a virtual channel 
(end-to-end) connection by sending the request to the 
competing networks.   
 The competing networks respond with their initial price 
offers B= (B1, B2, .., BN), where N is the number of 
competing networks. 
 After the initial bidding the broker submits to the 
networks the price of the minimum offer P= min (P1, P2, 
,.., PN), without revealing the identity of the competitor 
who offered this price, and ask the competitors to 
undercut the current minimum price. P1, .. PN are the 
prices offered by the competitors for a unit wavelength. 
 The network that offered the lowest price has no incentive 
to undercut its own price immediately. It will let the 
round go in case nobody cuts lower.  
 The competing network i undercuts the current bidding 
price P by an undercutting step value Ui as long as the 
corresponding marginal cost MCi (i=1..N) is not reached. 
 The undercutting step value Ui defined by network i is 
assumed to be stochastic. Each time the competitor 
undercuts the price, and the new price is P*i=P-Ui. 
  
B.  Stochastic price undercutting and equilibrium    
     Stochastic price undercutting is a price competition in 
which the price undercutting step Ui is chosen randomly in the 
interval [Li
min
, Li
max
], where Li
min
 and Li
max
 are respectively the 
minimum and maximum possible undercutting steps for 
network i. The undercutting step Ui is a uniformly distributed 
random variable in the interval [Li
min
, Li
max
].  The process of 
stochastic price undercutting has a lower limit, which is the 
equilibrium price. The price of the competing networks 
depends on the marginal cost. The equilibrium prices and the 
profit of two competing networks A and B will be as follows:   
 if MCA>MCB then equilibrium price of network B is  
pB= MCA   e 
 if MCA<MCB then equilibrium price of network A is  
pA= MCB    e   
 if MCA= MCB =MC then  price pB= pA =MC e, the 
user will choose Network A or Network B with 
equal probability. 
     Where  e is bounded by the following inequality:  
min (L1
min
, L2
min
)   e  max(L1
max
, L2
max
)  for stochastic price 
undercutting.  
     The outcome of the competition is decided by the marginal 
production cost (MC) of each competitor [10]. The proof of 
the equilibrium can be found in the standard texts of industrial 
organization such as [11]. 
IV. ROUTING AND WAVELENGTH ALLOCATION  
     In order to offer bids with minimal cost, a natural choice 
for routing in competitive optical networks is the minimum 
cost routing [12]. Therefore, the corresponding flow allocation 
has to be the minimum cost allocation, known also as 
minimum cost Routing Wavelength Allocation (RWA). The 
network is modeled as a set of nodes, Nodes= {1,2,..,N} and a 
set of optical links, L= {lxy} where lxy denotes the bidirectional 
link from node x to node y. Every optical link lxy is associated 
with a utilization cost pxy. The set of available wavelengths is 
= {1,2,..,W}. The network traffic is given as a set of 
connections, which have bandwidth demand dk and is 
associated with wavelengths and a sequence of optical links.  
Based on this, we can now designate the network parameters 
and variables, used for the routing and wavelength allocation. 
     The network parameters are:  
vk: the logical connection we want to realize 
dk: number of wavelengths demanded by customers for every 
logical channel 
 fxy: the maximum number of wavelengths for the link lxy  
 pxy: the cost for allocation of a wavelength for the link lxy 
     The network variables are: 
 b
k
w,xy: a flow binary variable, equal to one if a logical 
connection vk is carried on link lxy over fiber using wavelength 
w, and zero otherwise  
kw: a binary variable, equal to one if connection vk  is carried 
on wavelength w, and zero otherwise 
     The production cost optimization function of wavelength 
allocation is as follows: 

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 Flow conservation constraint: for every node x and 
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     Equation (1) states that a connection vk entering node x on 
wavelength w must leave the node on the same wavelength, 
thus ensuring wavelength continuity. 
 Capacity constraint  
xy
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K
k
k
xyw
W
w
fbb  
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,
11
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1
       (2) 
     Equation (2) specifies the capacity limit of every optical 
link, where fxy is the maximum number of wavelengths for link 
lxy . The wavelength can be directed on the link from node x to 
node y or from node y to node x, but are not bi-directional 
simultaneously.   
 Constraint for one traffic direction over single wavelength 
1,, 
j
yxw
k
xyw bb                  (3) 
     Equation (3) specifies that while the links (i.e. one fiber) 
are bi-directional on a single wavelength, the communication 
is only in one direction. As indicated earlier, b
k
w,xy is a flow 
variable equal to one if a logical connection vk is carried on 
link lxy over fiber using wavelength w, and zero otherwise,       
  1,0, 
k
xywb   
 Traffic demand constraint 



W
w
k
k
w d
1
, where }1,0{kw      (4)  
    Equation (4) ensures that the requested demand, interpreted 
as number of wavelengths for every optical connection, is 
actually allocated throughout the network.  
    This formulation can be cast as Mixed Integer Programming 
Formulation (MIP) [13]. Next, we present a case study on how 
a transport provider can utilize the existing resources of a 
network; improve the network planning with regard to 
profitability and survivability.  
V. SIMULATION RESULTS  
      In this section, we describe the model scenario used for the 
simulations. In figure 4, we consider two service providers 
competing with each other to allocate the brokers’ requests for 
end-to-end connectivity on virtual channels VC1, VC2, and 
VC3. We wish to point out that the most widely used network 
in the open literature is the National Science Foundation 
(NSF) network [14], which has 16 nodes. Some researchers as 
in [15], simulate their results using network size of 6 nodes, 
others like in [16] use a network size of 8 nodes. In our 
simulations we used the AMPL modeling language software  
with direct link to the solver CPLEX 7.0, this software is 
limited to 300 variables, this is the reason we have only 8 
nodes in the network. 
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Fig.4. Optical network competition scenario and virtual connection allocation 
     Our objective is to determine the profitability of the optical 
network when offering prices based on competition between 
the transport service providers. Furthermore, we need to 
provide a recommendation on network upgrade based on 
profit/loss analysis of the wavelengths sale over the virtual 
channels.  In order to do this, we first need to determine the 
operational profit and the amount of wavelengths sale on 
virtual channels VC1, VC2, and VC3 for both networks. Then 
we provide the analysis based on these results. 
     Figure 5 shows the number of active connections requests 
on each virtual channel. We assume that brokers have 
different price-demand functions for each virtual channel. For 
example the price-demand function on virtual channel 1 and 2 
could be linear while the price demand function on virtual 
channel 3 is non-linear. The allocation of the wavelength 
requests is performed using the min-cost optimization routing 
as described in section IV. In figure 6, we show the number of 
active requests served on network A and network B. In figure 
7, we show the resulting profit of Network A and Network B 
after the competition. Finally, in figure 8 and 9 we show the 
profit percentage form wavelength sale on each virtual 
channel for network A and network B.   
 
Fig. 5.  Number of connection requests on VC1, VC2 and VC3  
    
 
    Fig.6.  Number of active requests attracted and served by networks A and B 
 
     As we can see from figure 7, the performance of Network 
A in terms of profitability is much less when compared to 
Network B. The average profit of network A for 50 simulation 
runs is $21962, while the average profit of network B is 
$187506. Figure 8 and figure 9, show the resulting profit 
percentage of Network A and Network B from wavelengths 
sale. The profit from wavelengths sale as shown in figures 8 
and 9 indicates that Network B was better off when competing 
for customer requests on virtual channel VC3. In order to 
boost the competitive advantage of Network A, a physical 
connectivity upgrade along the routes that serve virtual 
channel VC3 needs to be considered. The decision where to 
place additional nodes and the corresponding appropriate links 
connections is a wide area of study, which is beyond the scope 
of this paper. However, in this study, the profit/loss analysis 
can be used as a criterion, which helps network designers and 
network architectures in the upgrading decision of the optical 
network to increase its profitability.  
 
Fig.7. Resulting profit of operating the networks 
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           Fig.8.Profit percentage from wavelengths sale on Network A 
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         Fig. 9. Profit percentage from wavelengths sale on Network B. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK  
     This paper is based on an economic feasibility study for a 
service  provider, offering transport network services in a 
competitive market where a pricing decision has to be chosen 
carefully to acquire market shares and stay profitable. We 
have proposed a microeconomic approach for routing and 
wavelength allocation in competitive non-cooperative disjoint 
optical networks. We modeled the pricing decisions as a game 
between two players and developed a messaging protocol 
supporting the competition process. Our plan for the future is 
to study other scenarios of competition and price undercutting. 
Also the implementation of heuristic (sub-optimal) routing 
strategies in the optical networks and their effects on the 
network competitiveness and profitability.   
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